Let’s further consider the logical possibilities of Venus Protocol being attacked: 1) Security experts say that some big investors were phished. Conventional wisdom suggests that they could just withdraw funds directly with the private key. How could there be a flash loan? Most likely, the hacker obtained updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining access to the account of a large investor, but without immediate liquidity to withdraw. In layman's terms, the hacker obtained the authority, but the large investor only had collateral, not the borrowed funds. The hacker had to find a way to obtain the collateral of the large investor. 2) Is it that the individual phishing incidents involving the major investor have nothing to do with the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovered that the major investor's account had no liquidity, their efforts would normally be in vain. But why was it possible to withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the Venus contract mechanism. The hacker may have used flash loans and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the major investor repay the collateral and even withdraw some extra. Simply put, it is true that the collateral of the big investors was stolen, but it is very likely that it will become a bad debt of the Venus contract platform, unless the big investors are stupid enough to pay back the platform. 3) While other users' funds are temporarily safe, the Venus platform faces significant liability concerns. While the attack was triggered by a large investor being phished by a social engineering scheme, the platform ultimately profited. The $30 million stolen is likely to become bad debt for the Venus platform, and coupled with the temporary panic and bank run, the impact could be devastating for Venus. But the greater impact is that this incident has brought back horrific memories of Venus's habitual attacks. The XVS price manipulation incident and its use as a tool for money laundering via BNB's cross-chain bridge are all examples of damage caused by fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, this is unacceptable. Note: The above is based on reasonable speculation based on the currently disclosed information. The details will be determined based on actual disclosed details.Let’s further consider the logical possibilities of Venus Protocol being attacked: 1) Security experts say that some big investors were phished. Conventional wisdom suggests that they could just withdraw funds directly with the private key. How could there be a flash loan? Most likely, the hacker obtained updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining access to the account of a large investor, but without immediate liquidity to withdraw. In layman's terms, the hacker obtained the authority, but the large investor only had collateral, not the borrowed funds. The hacker had to find a way to obtain the collateral of the large investor. 2) Is it that the individual phishing incidents involving the major investor have nothing to do with the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovered that the major investor's account had no liquidity, their efforts would normally be in vain. But why was it possible to withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the Venus contract mechanism. The hacker may have used flash loans and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the major investor repay the collateral and even withdraw some extra. Simply put, it is true that the collateral of the big investors was stolen, but it is very likely that it will become a bad debt of the Venus contract platform, unless the big investors are stupid enough to pay back the platform. 3) While other users' funds are temporarily safe, the Venus platform faces significant liability concerns. While the attack was triggered by a large investor being phished by a social engineering scheme, the platform ultimately profited. The $30 million stolen is likely to become bad debt for the Venus platform, and coupled with the temporary panic and bank run, the impact could be devastating for Venus. But the greater impact is that this incident has brought back horrific memories of Venus's habitual attacks. The XVS price manipulation incident and its use as a tool for money laundering via BNB's cross-chain bridge are all examples of damage caused by fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, this is unacceptable. Note: The above is based on reasonable speculation based on the currently disclosed information. The details will be determined based on actual disclosed details.

Why is it always stolen? On the systemic flaws in Venus contract design

2025/09/03 13:00

Let’s further consider the logical possibilities of Venus Protocol being attacked:

1) Security experts say that some big investors were phished. Conventional wisdom suggests that they could just withdraw funds directly with the private key. How could there be a flash loan?

Most likely, the hacker obtained updateDelegate authorization through social engineering, gaining access to the account of a large investor, but without immediate liquidity to withdraw. In layman's terms, the hacker obtained the authority, but the large investor only had collateral, not the borrowed funds. The hacker had to find a way to obtain the collateral of the large investor.

2) Is it that the individual phishing incidents involving the major investor have nothing to do with the Venus contract? As mentioned earlier, if the hacker discovered that the major investor's account had no liquidity, their efforts would normally be in vain. But why was it possible to withdraw collateral through a simple flash loan attack? The answer lies in the Venus contract mechanism. The hacker may have used flash loans and a series of vToken cross-platform exchange rate differences to help the major investor repay the collateral and even withdraw some extra.

Simply put, it is true that the collateral of the big investors was stolen, but it is very likely that it will become a bad debt of the Venus contract platform, unless the big investors are stupid enough to pay back the platform.

3) While other users' funds are temporarily safe, the Venus platform faces significant liability concerns. While the attack was triggered by a large investor being phished by a social engineering scheme, the platform ultimately profited. The $30 million stolen is likely to become bad debt for the Venus platform, and coupled with the temporary panic and bank run, the impact could be devastating for Venus.

But the greater impact is that this incident has brought back horrific memories of Venus's habitual attacks. The XVS price manipulation incident and its use as a tool for money laundering via BNB's cross-chain bridge are all examples of damage caused by fundamental flaws in Venus's security engineering. As the largest lending protocol on BSC, this is unacceptable. Note: The above is based on reasonable speculation based on the currently disclosed information. The details will be determined based on actual disclosed details.

Market Opportunity
Binance Coin Logo
Binance Coin Price(BNB)
$865.09
$865.09$865.09
+0.69%
USD
Binance Coin (BNB) Live Price Chart
Disclaimer: The articles reposted on this site are sourced from public platforms and are provided for informational purposes only. They do not necessarily reflect the views of MEXC. All rights remain with the original authors. If you believe any content infringes on third-party rights, please contact service@support.mexc.com for removal. MEXC makes no guarantees regarding the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the content and is not responsible for any actions taken based on the information provided. The content does not constitute financial, legal, or other professional advice, nor should it be considered a recommendation or endorsement by MEXC.

You May Also Like

The Channel Factories We’ve Been Waiting For

The Channel Factories We’ve Been Waiting For

The post The Channel Factories We’ve Been Waiting For appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. Visions of future technology are often prescient about the broad strokes while flubbing the details. The tablets in “2001: A Space Odyssey” do indeed look like iPads, but you never see the astronauts paying for subscriptions or wasting hours on Candy Crush.  Channel factories are one vision that arose early in the history of the Lightning Network to address some challenges that Lightning has faced from the beginning. Despite having grown to become Bitcoin’s most successful layer-2 scaling solution, with instant and low-fee payments, Lightning’s scale is limited by its reliance on payment channels. Although Lightning shifts most transactions off-chain, each payment channel still requires an on-chain transaction to open and (usually) another to close. As adoption grows, pressure on the blockchain grows with it. The need for a more scalable approach to managing channels is clear. Channel factories were supposed to meet this need, but where are they? In 2025, subnetworks are emerging that revive the impetus of channel factories with some new details that vastly increase their potential. They are natively interoperable with Lightning and achieve greater scale by allowing a group of participants to open a shared multisig UTXO and create multiple bilateral channels, which reduces the number of on-chain transactions and improves capital efficiency. Achieving greater scale by reducing complexity, Ark and Spark perform the same function as traditional channel factories with new designs and additional capabilities based on shared UTXOs.  Channel Factories 101 Channel factories have been around since the inception of Lightning. A factory is a multiparty contract where multiple users (not just two, as in a Dryja-Poon channel) cooperatively lock funds in a single multisig UTXO. They can open, close and update channels off-chain without updating the blockchain for each operation. Only when participants leave or the factory dissolves is an on-chain transaction…
Share
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/09/18 00:09
SOLANA NETWORK Withstands 6 Tbps DDoS Without Downtime

SOLANA NETWORK Withstands 6 Tbps DDoS Without Downtime

The post SOLANA NETWORK Withstands 6 Tbps DDoS Without Downtime appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. In a pivotal week for crypto infrastructure, the Solana network
Share
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/12/16 20:44
Why The Green Bay Packers Must Take The Cleveland Browns Seriously — As Hard As That Might Be

Why The Green Bay Packers Must Take The Cleveland Browns Seriously — As Hard As That Might Be

The post Why The Green Bay Packers Must Take The Cleveland Browns Seriously — As Hard As That Might Be appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. Jordan Love and the Green Bay Packers are off to a 2-0 start. Getty Images The Green Bay Packers are, once again, one of the NFL’s better teams. The Cleveland Browns are, once again, one of the league’s doormats. It’s why unbeaten Green Bay (2-0) is a 8-point favorite at winless Cleveland (0-2) Sunday according to betmgm.com. The money line is also Green Bay -500. Most expect this to be a Packers’ rout, and it very well could be. But Green Bay knows taking anyone in this league for granted can prove costly. “I think if you look at their roster, the paper, who they have on that team, what they can do, they got a lot of talent and things can turn around quickly for them,” Packers safety Xavier McKinney said. “We just got to kind of keep that in mind and know we not just walking into something and they just going to lay down. That’s not what they going to do.” The Browns certainly haven’t laid down on defense. Far from. Cleveland is allowing an NFL-best 191.5 yards per game. The Browns gave up 141 yards to Cincinnati in Week 1, including just seven in the second half, but still lost, 17-16. Cleveland has given up an NFL-best 45.5 rushing yards per game and just 2.1 rushing yards per attempt. “The biggest thing is our defensive line is much, much improved over last year and I think we’ve got back to our personality,” defensive coordinator Jim Schwartz said recently. “When we play our best, our D-line leads us there as our engine.” The Browns rank third in the league in passing defense, allowing just 146.0 yards per game. Cleveland has also gone 30 straight games without allowing a 300-yard passer, the longest active streak in the NFL.…
Share
BitcoinEthereumNews2025/09/18 00:41